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ARTICLES
GETTING BLOOD FROM STONES: RESULTS AND POLICY
IMPLICATIONS OF AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF CHILD
SUPPORT PRACTICE IN ST. JOSEPH COUNTY, INDIANA PATERNITY
ACTIONS
Margaret F. Brinig and Marsha Garrison
Today, there is consensus that the current system of allocating and enforcing child support obligations does not work well for
disadvantaged families, most of which are nonmarital. Nonmarital children are less likely to have support orders established
than marital children, and they are much less likely to experience full payment. In this article, we report data on child support
awards and enforcement associated with a sample of paternity actions brought in 2008 or 2010 in St. Joseph County,
Indiana. We found that child support practice in St. Joseph County promotes limited contact between children and their
absent fathers, nonpayment of prior support obligations, and the accrual of arrears that can never be paid. These results
strongly support recent changes in federal child support regulations and programs that postdate the orders in our study. Our
results also demonstrate both the need for additional reforms and the difficulties that lie ahead as the states begin to grapple
with applying the new standards.
Key Points for the Family Court Community:
• Child support enforcement among the very disadvantaged neither makes fathers more responsible nor collects signifi-
cant money
• It also makes contact with their children less likely and results in the amassing of arrearages that will never be paid
• While recent federal legal changes move in the right direction, we fear that local agencies are still unable to calculate
incomes when none can be shown, and, as with credit for other paid support orders, resort to shortcuts that are inaccu-
rate and unproductive
Keywords: Child Support; Child Support Enforcement; Empirical Research; Indigent Fathers; Nonmarital Children; Pater-
nity; Poverty; and Unmarried Parents.
Today, there is consensus that the current system of calculating and enforcing support obliga-
tions does not work well for disadvantaged families, most of which are nonmarital. Nonmarital chil-
dren are less likely to have support orders established than marital children, and they are much less
likely to experience full payment.
In this article, we report data on parenting time, child support calculation, and enforcement
actions in a population of nonmarital children for whom paternity actions were brought in 2008 or
2010 in St. Joseph County, Indiana. The computerized, court-based record system we utilized to
collect data gave us access to information on parental characteristics and child outcomes that other
researchers investigating child support practice in disadvantaged populations have been unable to
access. Our research thus offers an unusually data-rich window into current outcomes in a popula-
tion where problems are large and new solutions are desperately needed. Our findings demonstrate
that recent changes in federal child support regulations and programs, which postdate the orders in
our study, were very much needed. Our findings also demonstrate the need for additional reforms
and the difficulties that lie ahead as the states begin to grapple with applying the new standards.
Corresponding: marsha.garrison@brooklaw.edu; Margaret.Brinig.1@nd.edu
FAMILY COURT REVIEW, Vol. 56 No. 4, October 2018 521–543
© 2018 Association of Family and Conciliation Courts
I. THE DEVELOPMENT, AIMS, AND RESULTS OF U.S. CHILD SUPPORT POLICY
Ensuring that child support orders are entered and enforced against nonresident, “deadbeat”
fathers1 has been a guiding principle of U.S. support law for the past half century. Current law and
practice generally derives from a federal initiative, inaugurated in 1975, designed to raise support
values and increase the likelihood that a support award would be paid. This initiative stemmed from
sharp increases both in the number of single-parent families2 and in the cost of public assistance to
these families.3 Due to similar demographic shifts and increased public-assistance burdens, many
other industrialized nations initiated comparable changes in child support law and practice during
the same period.4
The first major U.S. legislation, enacted by Congress in 1975, established the federal Office of
Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) and required the states to create their own child support
enforcement agencies as a condition of receiving reimbursement for public assistance to needy chil-
dren and their families (Aid to Families with Dependent Children [AFDC]).5 The new federal law
required parents (typically mothers) applying for AFDC benefits to assign their child support claims
to the state as a condition of receiving assistance. It required the new support agencies (popularly
described as IV-D agencies because they originated in Title IV-D of the federal Social Security
Act) to establish support obligations for absent parents of federal-supported children, collect support
from those parents, and provide a parent-locator service equipped to search state and local records
for information on parents who could not be found. To reduce applications for public assistance,
the 1975 law also made IV-D services available to all parents who paid a reasonable fee.
The 1975 requirements were expanded by the Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984
(CSEA)6 and Family Support Act of 1988.7 These new laws required the states to change the method
by which child support orders were calculated. Support determination had previously relied primarily
on judicial discretion to produce an award value; under the new federal rules, states were required to
adopt guidelines that took into account “all earnings and income of the absent parent” and used “spe-
cific descriptive and numeric criteria” to produce a presumptive award value.8 CSEA also required
the states to add new enforcement weapons to their arsenals, including immediate wage withholding,
the imposition of liens against nonpaying obligors, the deduction of unpaid support from federal and
state income tax refunds, and statutes of limitation permitting the establishment of paternity up to
eighteen years after a child’s birth. This package of requirements was further expanded by the Per-
sonal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,9 which mandated innova-
tions in paternity establishment, expanded informational resources used for parent locating, required
certain expedited procedures for routine cases, and provided funds for programs to improve unem-
ployed fathers’ job prospects and to support fathers’ access to their children.
In response to these various federal mandates, state child support law and practice have shifted
dramatically. Before the 1975 law was enacted, parents seeking support were invariably forced to
find the obligor parent themselves and to pay for legal assistance in establishing and/or enforcing a
support award; today, 50–60% of all support orders are obtained through the IV-D program.10
Before federally required innovations in paternity establishment, paternity was often not established;
indeed, in 1979, the ratio of paternities established by IV-D offices to the number of nonmarital
births was .19.11 Today, paternity is established in 100% of IV-D cases.12 The shift in law and prac-
tice has also dramatically increased child support collections. In fiscal year 1977, state IV-D agen-
cies served fewer than a million cases and collected less than $1 billion. In fiscal year 2015, these
same agencies served nearly 16 million children and collected $28.6 billion.13
Increased child support collections serve a range of goals. Child support payments lift approxi-
mately a million family members out of poverty every year.14 Because of child support’s positive
effects on labor supply, welfare participation, fertility, and marriage decisions, every dollar of sup-
port paid also lifts the household income of recipient families by a much larger amount.15 More-
over, because fathers who pay child support are more likely to spend time with their children,16 it is
possible that the federal child support program has increased parent–child contact for at least some
children.17
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Despite these successes, the likelihood of neither a formal child support order nor full payment
has increased. In 1979, when the first federal survey of child support awards was published, 59.1%
of mothers eligible to receive child support had obtained support orders, and about half of those
awarded support received full payment.18 In 2014, 53.1% of eligible mothers had a court order or
some type of agreement to receive financial support from the noncustodial parent(s), and 46.2%
received full payment.19 In inflation-adjusted dollars, the average value of a support award actually
declined from $5,866 in 1978 to $3,936 in 2014.20
The reason for the seeming anomaly of vastly increased child support collections but lower
award rates and values is a substantial increase in single-parent families. Between 1975 and 2016,
the number of U.S. single-parent families increased from 4.9 to 11 million.21 The percentage of
U.S. children living with a single parent also increased, from 17% in 1975 to 26.8% in 2015.22
This increase in single-parent households—the type eligible for child support—was initially
driven, in part, by a rising divorce rate. But the U.S. divorce rate in recent years has leveled off and
even declined for college-educated couples.23 The continuing increase in the proportion of single-
parent households is thus due to a dramatic rise in nonmarital parenting. In 1970, 11% of
U.S. births were nonmarital24; in 2015, 40.3% of U.S. births took place outside of marriage.25
Nonmarital relationships are much less stable than marital relationships, and they tend to termi-
nate more quickly. In the United States, children born to unmarried parents are about three times as
likely to see their parents separate before the age of five as are children born to married parents.26
Moreover, as compared to married fathers, unmarried fathers are, on average, younger when their
first child is born,27 less well educated,28 and have lower income.29 They are less likely to be in the
labor force than married fathers30 and more likely to be members of a racial or ethnic minority.31
Today’s population of support obligors contains a high percentage of disadvantaged men with
deeply impaired capacity to adequately support their children. Indeed, based on a 1998 survey,
researchers calculated that one-third of nonresident, unmarried U.S. fathers lived in a household
with income below the poverty line.32 Given declining male wages for all but the college-educated
over the past twenty years,33 the proportion of support obligors who are poor may be even higher
today.
The low capacity of unmarried fathers to pay support is exacerbated by the fact that they are far
more likely than married fathers to have children with more than one mother. Researchers have
found that men unmarried when their first child is born are three to four times as likely to have chil-
dren with additional partners as compared to fathers married at the birth of their first child.34
Multiple-partner fertility (MPF) translates into multiple support obligations, much harder to meet
than just one.
An accumulating body of evidence has also revealed that the current system for assessing and
collecting child support does not work well for low-income obligors. First, support orders typically
require poor obligors to pay a much higher income percentage than that mandated for higher-
income obligors.35 For example, one survey found that 28% of poor fathers were required to pay
half or more of their incomes in child support.36 Such almost-impossible-to-meet obligations result
primarily from state rules that impose minimum support obligations37 or impute income to unem-
ployed parents.38 Both types of rules are common; in 2013, approximately half of the states had
support guidelines that mandated a minimum payment obligation,39 and all states permit income
imputation.
Unsurprisingly, high-percentage support obligations produce nonpayment. Researchers have
found that both the percentage of current support collected and payment consistency significantly
decline when an obligor is required to pay more than 20% of his gross income.40 They have also
found that support orders based on fictional, imputed income will most likely yield $0 in total pay-
ments during the year after the order was entered.41
In many states, noncustodial parents whose children receive federally funded public assistance
benefits also have reduced incentives to pay support because whatever they do pay goes directly to
the state and will not benefit their children. Despite strong evidence that policies under which an
obligor’s support is passed through to the residential parent without a reduction in public benefits
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increase children’s support without reducing parental workforce participation or producing large
public costs,42 about half of the states retain all support payments they collect from obligors whose
children receive public assistance.43
To avoid paying the state, many low-income obligors make in-kind contributions to their chil-
dren.44 In surveys, 40–50% of low-income mothers eligible for child support report in-kind contri-
butions from fathers.45 The value of these contributions is often significant, particularly in view of
fathers’ low incomes.46 But these contributions do not count in the formal support system.
Thus, low-income obligors are responsible for the bulk of unpaid child support. Indeed, in one
nine-state study, 70% of unpaid child-support debt was owed by parents with incomes of $10,000
per year or less.47 Many of these low-income obligors are unemployed. In another survey, only
34% worked full time, and only 8% worked full time throughout the year; 41% (excluding those
incarcerated) had not worked at all during the prior year.48
When a support obligor is not working, wage withholding—which accounted for three-quarters
of all child support collections in 201549—cannot ensure that he makes payments. The problem of
collection is particularly acute for men who have been incarcerated.50 Although the proportion of
currently incarcerated noncustodial parents in state and federal prisons is only about 5% of the total
IV-D caseload, 30–40% of cases state offices describe as “hard to collect” involve a noncustodial
parent with a criminal record.51
Because low-income parents with arrears often have no assets that can be attached or wages that
can be garnished, IV-D agencies have typically employed the threat of jail—civil contempt
proceedings—as a means of collection.52 Although we lack hard data on either the number of con-
tempt petitions filed by IV-D agencies or the proportion of these petitions targeted at obligors
unable to pay, commentators have generally concluded both that contempt is routinely used when
wage withholding is unavailable and that most of those who go to jail are unable to pay.53
Mounting evidence of the disproportionate support burden borne by low-income parents has led
some critics to argue that support nonpayment results more from dads being “dead broke” than
“deadbeat.”54 Not all of the evidence supports the hypothesis that low income drives support non-
payment; for example, researchers have found that fathers are more likely to pay support, both for-
mally and informally, if they are in continued contact with their children.55 But it is now clear that
low income, unrealistic support obligations, and lack of payment incentives all play a major role in
obligors’ failure to pay.
In recent years, the OCSE has responded to the accumulating research on nonpayment and obli-
gor poverty with several new initiatives. To reduce payment disincentives for children supported by
public assistance, the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 required the federal government to share in the
cost of child support collections for children supported by public assistance that was passed through
to custodial parents.56
New child-support regulations that became effective in 2017 address the problem of fictional,
imputed income and civil contempt.57 The new regulations require IV-D agencies to base support
obligations on “the specific circumstances of the noncustodial parent”; the OCSE’s interpretive
memo specifies that, under this standard, “[i]mputing income will need to be done on a case-by-
case basis, when there is an evidentiary gap.”58 The regulations also address excessive use of civil
contempt by requiring agencies to determine whether a support obligor has the “actual and present”
ability to pay his support obligation as a precondition to filing a contempt petition and to provide
the relevant court with information regarding such ability.59
Since 2012, the OCSE has also funded a number of demonstration projects aimed at helping
low-income fathers gain the capacity to meaningfully support their children.60 This initiative is
based on research showing that child-support-linked employment programs are more likely than
others to yield positive results for support obligors and their children.61 Evaluation of these OCSE
programs has not yet been completed, but a review of other child-support-linked employment pro-
grams found that some strategies had promising effects on the employment and earnings of low-
income adults.62 The effects were extremely modest, however, and surveys suggest that many poor
obligors face major barriers in obtaining employment. In one survey, 41% lacked a high school
524 FAMILY COURT REVIEW
diploma, a quarter had a health condition that limited their capacity to work, and 16% were institu-
tionalized, mostly in prison.63 Designing programs that work for obligors so multiply disadvantaged
will be a challenging task.
II. OUR STUDY SITE AND SAMPLE
Our study focuses on 688 paternity actions brought in St. Joseph County, Indiana during 2008
and 2010.64 For these cases, the court-based record system that we obtained judicial permission to
access provided us with extraordinarily rich and detailed information about focal children (the old-
est born to parents named in the paternity order) and their families. Unusually (perhaps uniquely),
the record system provides clickable links to other family court records for parents and their chil-
dren. Using this system, we were able to access detailed information on initial child support awards,
award modification and enforcement, the allocation of parenting time and legal custody, orders of
protection, child maltreatment reports and findings, juvenile status and delinquency charges, and
the child’s and parents’ addresses and moves. The court records also enabled us to determine if the
focal child’s parents had children with other partners and, most of the time, both the number of
other partners involved and the total number of children the parent had with those partners. For
half-siblings living in St. Joseph County, we were able to access the same information available for
focal children and their siblings. The same information was available for parents if the parent lived
in St. Joseph County during his/her minority. For children and parents with a history of court
involvement, the files also contained case notes. For example, we could typically see the results of
drug tests, the number and duration of residential placements, school history (truancy, expulsion,
behavioral problems), family background (parents involved in crime, family receives welfare, etc.),
and the child’s mental and emotional state (suicide precautions, risk of violence, known substance
abuse). Using other databases, we were also able to determine whether parents had adult criminal
records, if they had been incarcerated, and, most of the time, the charges that produced imprison-
ment. In sum, the database from which we obtained case information offered the opportunity to
look at child support practice in an unusually detailed way.
The study site, St. Joseph County, Indiana, is also an excellent location in which to examine the
calculation and enforcement of child support for nonmarital children. The demography of
St. Joseph County is fairly consistent with that of the United States as a whole except that it is
somewhat poorer and has a lower proportion of Hispanic and foreign-born residents.65 St. Joseph
County also offers extremes. It is home to the University of Notre Dame, a prestigious school with
more than 1,000 full-time faculty members and a large professional staff. It also contains South
Bend (population around 100,000), a once-thriving hub of manufacturing employment that is now,
like most of the American rust belt, struggling with a massive decline in stable, blue-collar employ-
ment. Most Notre Dame faculty and staff live in or near St. Joseph County, creating a large base of
well-educated, well-paid citizens. But South Bend also has entrenched pockets of deep poverty. In
2015, The Economist reported that “[t]he city’s unemployment rate remains in the low double digits;
28% of its inhabitants live below the poverty line and 75% of children in public schools are eligible
for the free lunches offered to low-income families.”66 St. Joseph County is thus a place that, in the
aggregate, is pretty average. But its averages mask large contrasts and, reflecting these contrasts,
crime, unemployment, poverty—and the families we studied—are highly concentrated in some
neighborhoods.67
Our sample, composed exclusively of unmarried parents, reflects the demographic variables—
youth, membership in a racial minority, MPF, and low income—associated with nonmarital birth.68
Fathers’ median age at the birth of the focal child was 25.0 years; mothers’ median age was 22.2.69
Fully 51% of sample fathers for whom race information was available were African American,70
more than four times the proportion of African Americans in St. Joseph County generally.71 We
found that 56.8% of mothers and 47.8% of fathers had at least one child with another partner.72
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Indeed, thirteen mothers and fifteen fathers were parties to two (or, in one case, three) paternity
actions.73
Median family income for the sample was $27,248 per year, well below the $42,316 St. Joseph
County median74; only 25% of sample parents had combined incomes exceeding $30,680 per year.
As one would expect, individual parental incomes were also low. The median paternal income was
$13,624 per year. In 5.9% of cases, the father had a listed income of zero dollars,75 and 25% had
incomes of $12,168 per year or less. Maternal incomes were quite similar. Median maternal income
was, again, $13,624 per year; 6.7% of mothers had listed incomes of zero dollars; and 25% had
incomes of $12,168 per year or less.
African American incomes lag behind those of non-Hispanic Whites nationally.76 This was also
true in the study population, at least for men. Fathers’ incomes varied significantly by their own
race/ethnicity77 and that of the mother.78 Mothers’ incomes did not vary significantly by either the
father’s or the mother’s race/ethnicity; only the mother’s identification as non-Hispanic White was
significantly correlated with her income.79
A very high percentage of both mothers and fathers also had incomes that are highly likely to be
imputed. Indeed, this is why the median income of mothers and fathers in the lowest income quar-
tiles are identical. Although the Indiana Supreme Court has disallowed the practice of imputing
income when a parent is incarcerated,80 the Indiana Support Guidelines in effect when support
orders in the cases we studied were entered permit income imputation in a range of other circum-
stances. More specifically, although the guidelines specified that income imputation “may be inap-
propriate … when a parent … suffers from a debilitating mental illness, a debilitating health issue,
or is caring for a disabled child,” and “when a custodial parent with young children at home has no
significant skills or education and is unemployed,” they also encourage income imputation for most
unemployed parents. Under the guidelines,
[e]ven though an unemployed parent has never worked before, potential income should be considered
for that parent if he or she voluntarily remains unemployed without justification [and] …
[w]hen a parent is unemployed by reason of involuntary layoff or job termination, it still may be appro-
priate to include an amount in gross income representing that parent’s potential income. . . . 81
Although the guidelines state that “potential income shall be [assessed] … by determining employ-
ment potential and probable earnings level based on the obligor’s work history, occupational qualifi-
cations, prevailing job opportunities, and earnings levels in the community,”82 they also specify
that, in the absence of “any other evidence of potential earnings,” the “federal minimum wage
should be used in calculating potential income for that parent.”83 The guidelines currently in effect
suggest a somewhat more discretionary approach, specifying that “[p]otential income equivalent to
the federal minimum wage may be attributed to that parent.”84
In our sample, approximately half (47.1% of fathers, 55.9% of mothers) of parents whose
incomes were recorded had listed income that was likely imputed85; 39.2% of fathers and 47.4% of
mothers had listed incomes representing the value of the minimum wage for the year in question
multiplied by forty hours.86 An additional 7.9% of fathers and 8.5% of mothers had listed incomes
of $104 per week, a value representing one-half of the federal poverty-level income for a single per-
son. This lower-value imputed income was introduced by the local IV-D agency in 2010. The
unwritten policy authorizes the lower value when a parent has a known substance-abuse problem,
impaired work ability due to a medical problem, a felony record, and when s/he lacks both a high
school diploma or GED degree and an employment history.87 Prior to 2010, the minimum-wage
value was invariably used to measure imputed income when there was no basis for a higher figure.
The evidence from our sample thus strongly suggests that the Support Guidelines’ command to
“consider” income imputation has had the effect, in St. Joseph County, of producing automatic
income imputation for individuals who are not working or not working officially. The files also
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suggest an “either-or” decision: if the parent was not working, the minimum-wage imputation value
was assigned unless the IV-D attorney concluded (after 2010) that the $104 figure was appropriate.
The father’s history of incarceration and his history of drug/alcohol abuse, the two stated decision-
making factors on which we typically had case information, were both significantly correlated with
wage imputation at the $104 level.88 However, the case files contained absolutely no information on
parents’ education level, work history, or job training. Therefore, we cannot fully assess how consis-
tently the lower value was applied.
The father-obligor’s having likely imputed income at the minimum-wage level was positively and
significantly related to the imputation of income to the mother at that level, the father’s African
American race,89 and his having failed to appear at the paternity establishment hearing. It was nega-
tively related to a 2010 petition year, the mother’s residence in St. Joseph County at or before age
fourteen, the father’s receipt of disability benefits or being incarcerated, and mediator
involvement.90
However, these variables explained only 22–30% of case variance (see Table 1).91
In cases of imputed income, we have no way of knowing how much income the parent to whom
income was imputed actually earns. He may be working off the books (engaged in activities that are
legal or illegal), but the resources from which child support might come are, at best, speculative.
The high level of income imputation in our sample suggests a high level of poverty. But given
that both mothers and fathers often lived in complex households that included children from other
relationships and new partners with children from earlier relationships, it is close to impossible to
estimate how many parents and children lived below the poverty line.
We can say that the vast majority of sample families had incomes well below what would be
needed for self-sufficiency. The Indiana Self-Sufficiency Calculator, developed by the Indiana Insti-
tute for Working Families, captures “the income working families need to meet their basic necessi-
ties without private or public assistance.”92 In St. Joseph County in 2016, a family composed of
one adult and one preschool-age child needed a $17.91 hourly wage—$33,300 per year in $2009—
to achieve self-sufficiency, well above the $27,248 median total income of sample parents.
Another clue to the sample’s poverty rate is the large proportion—95.3%—who were in the IV-
D program. IV-D involvement is mandatory where a child is receiving federal welfare benefits or is
in foster care, both strongly linked to poverty. And, while use of the IV-D program is optional, ser-
vices are not limited to those who are low income; surveys show that parents who are poor, never
married, young, and poorly educated are much more likely to receive IV-D services than others.
Nationally, in 2010, 52% of parents in the IV-D program had family incomes below 150% of the
poverty line, 47% were never married, 30% were under thirty years of age, and 12% had a college
degree. By contrast, only 28% of non-IV-D families had comparable low incomes; only 27% were
never married, 16% were under age thirty, and 24% had a college degree. Reflecting these divergent
Table 1
Predictors of Paternal Income Imputed at Minimum Wage (Father Required to Pay Support,
N = 621)
Variable B Stand. Error Wald Signif. Odds Ratio
Father is African American .651 .199 10.711 .001 1.917
Father did not appear .896 .331 7.329 .007 2.450
Father incarcerated or disability recipient −3.205 .783 16.766 <.001 .041
Father’s total known moves .079 .023 12.290 <.001 1.083
Focal child has half-sibling .469 .219 4.573 .032 1.599
Mother’s income imputed at minimum wage 1.282 .198 41.953 <.001 3.604
Mediator involved −1.960 .805 5.927 .015 .141
Mother in county from age 14 .660 .210 9.917 .002 1.935
2010 petition year −.696 .210 10.955 .001 .498
Constant −2.306 .301 58.559 <.001 .100
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profiles, about two-thirds of IV-D recipients receive some sort of public assistance, as compared to
25% of the non-IV-D group.93 The IV-D population is also disproportionately composed of women
and parents of color. Nearly 90% are female, and close to half are either African American (27%)
or Hispanic (20%).94 Given the strong correlation between IV-D and disadvantage, it is unsurpris-
ing that, in our sample, IV-D status was significantly and negatively correlated with both maternal
and paternal income.95
While the demographic characteristics of our sample are consistent with those of American non-
marital parents generally, the sample contains an even larger proportion of unstable relationships. In
the U.S. Fragile Families study, 35% of couples with a nonmarital child were still together after five
years.96 In our population, the median age of focal children (the first born to this mother and father)
at the time a paternity/support order was entered was two years (average 3.6 years), and only 24.6%
of focal children were five years or older at order entry.97
Perhaps reflecting this high level of instability, in a very large proportion of sample cases, pater-
nity was established through genetic testing at the time a paternity action was brought while, nation-
ally, paternity is established consensually through an affidavit of paternity signed by both parents in
the hospital at least 60% of the time.98 The court records typically did not permit us to determine
which parents cohabited and which did not, but the high rate of genetic testing also suggests a lower
rate of cohabitation than among the general pool of unmarried parents.
Given the lack of national data, we cannot draw comparisons between the sample and the larger
pool of nonmarital parents with respect to involvement with the child welfare system, family court,
and criminal justice system. But the parents we studied had a very high rate of such involvement.
Almost a quarter (23.8%) of sample mothers had one or more children who were the subject of a
substantiated child maltreatment report, 30.1% of fathers had been incarcerated, and 30.7% of
fathers had a record of alcohol or drug abuse. For fathers who lived in St. Joseph County by age
fourteen, 28.5% had at least one juvenile status (runaway, truancy, habitual disobedience, curfew
violations) record, and 50.2% had at least one juvenile delinquency arrest.
In sum, our study population is disproportionately composed of the most disadvantaged and
most fragile of nonmarital families, a group that is itself far more fragile and disadvantaged than
marital families.
III. LEGAL CUSTODYAND PARENTING TIME: ALLOCATION PATTERNS AND
PREDICTABILITY
Support obligations typically follow the assignment of primary residential care, alternately
described as primary physical custody. When the mother obtains primary custody, the father is the
support obligor, and vice versa. If the child lives with both parents a significant amount of the time,
child support obligations may be eliminated entirely or the higher-income parent may obtain a sig-
nificant reduction in his support obligation as compared to what he would have been obliged to pay
had the child lived primarily with one parent. Legal custody, which determines decision-making
rights, may again be assigned to one parent or shared. The legal custody assignment does not typi-
cally affect support obligations, however.
Among the families in our sample, mothers were awarded primary physical and legal custody in
94.2% of cases in which a custody order was made.99 Fathers obtained primary physical and legal
custody in only 2.4% of cases and shared custody in .3%; father custody was less likely than a cus-
tody award to a third party (3.1%).100
Mothers failed to obtain primary custody primarily when they were unable to perform parenting
functions: 45% of father or third-party custody cases involved a mother who was imprisoned or
who had a known alcohol or drug addiction problem, and 51% involved a mother with at least one
substantiated child-maltreatment report. Shared custody was ordered in only two cases, one of
which involved split custody. Even where the father was awarded visitation amounting to half the
year or more, mothers still, invariably, obtained primary physical and legal custody.101
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Extensive visitation was rare, however. The average number of overnight visits awarded to sam-
ple fathers was thirty-three, less than half the average for previously married fathers in Indiana dur-
ing the same time period.102 Only 21% obtained at least 52 (one night per week) or more visits,
and 68% of fathers were awarded no visitation at all.103 Indiana has enacted parenting-time guide-
lines explicitly specifying that nonmarital fathers are entitled to the same visitation as marital fathers
so this result does not reflect any legal bias against visitation by nonmarital fathers.104
The number of overnight visits awarded to the father was positively related to the value of the
basic total support award,105 the father’s dollar share of the total support obligation, and the focal
child’s male gender106; it was negatively related to the father’s self-representation at the paternity
proceeding, his having failed to appear at the time support and visitation were determined,107 the
value of the final child support order,108 the focal child’s history of maltreatment or guardianship,
and an incarceration history for one or both parents. However, these variables explained only about
20% of case variance.109 Prior orders of protection were not significantly related to the father’s visit-
ing time110; the low level of visitation thus cannot be explained as a reaction to reported intimate-
partner violence (see Table 2).
IV. SUPPORT AWARD CALCULATION: VALUE AND PREDICTABILITY
Even in the rare cases where mothers did not obtain custody, they were unlikely to be ordered to
pay support. Among the 676 cases in which a support obligation was imposed, fathers were
required to pay support in 96.9%. Thus, our analysis of support orders is confined to paternal
obligations.
The Indiana Support Guidelines use combined parental income, the number of children in the
family, the amount of residential time allocated to each parent, and each parent’s support obligations
for children with other partners to produce a presumptive support value.111 For example, under the
2007 guidelines in effect when sample orders were made,112 when combined parental income is
$150 per week, the parents have one child, and there are no other children with other partners, the
presumptive award value is $22; that value increases to $30 if the couple has two children and $35
if there are three (assuming that, again, the parents have no children with other partners). If the par-
ents were to have combined income of $170 per week, their support obligation would increase to
$28 (one child), $38 (two children), and $48 (three children). The obligor parent’s share of the total
presumptive value is based on his share of total income after credits for obligations to prior children
are subtracted. Health insurance and childcare costs, when relevant, are added to the presumptive
award. If a judge makes a child support award, s/he must justify deviation from the presumptive
award, but the parents may agree to a different support value. Some states provide low-income
Table 2
Predictors of Father Visitation (Number of Overnight Visits: Father Ordered to Pay Support and
Mother Has Primary Custody, N = 647)
Variable Beta (Unstand.) Stand. Error Beta (Stand.) T Signif.
Constant 17.264 10.601 1.628 .104
Parental incarceration −17.603 5.320 −.138 −3.309 .001
Final CS order ($) −.613 .073 −.449 −8.406 <.001
Basic Total CS order ($) .452 .064 .381 7.063 <.001
Focal child was male 18.598 4.745 .159 3.919 <.001
Father appeared at hearing 20.600 6.660 .127 3.093 .002
Father had no lawyer −20.141 6.479 −.126 −3.109 .002
Focal child history of maltreatment or guardianship −16.746 8.503 −.080 −1.969 .049
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obligors with a self-support reserve or income-based obligation adjustment; the Indiana Support
Guidelines do not. They do specify $12 “as a minimum child support order.” However, they also
state that “there are situations where a $0.00 support order is appropriate.”113
For our sample, the value of child support awards was low, reflecting the low incomes of parents.
For cases in which the father was ordered to pay support, the average award was $51.29 weekly, the
median $45 weekly114; 12.2% of obligor fathers were ordered to pay nothing, and 15.7% were
required to pay $10 per week or less; the guidelines “minimum” of $12 was imposed as the final
award in only twelve cases (1.8%). The highest award was $330 weekly; only 9.5% of awards were
$100 per week or higher. Unsurprisingly, the value of the final child support order was positively
and significantly related to both maternal115 and paternal income.116
For cases in which the father’s income was stated as more than zero, awards averaged 19.25% of
his gross income (median value, 16.6%).117 In 25% of cases, awards represented 11.5% of gross
income or less; in 25% of cases, the ratio of award to gross income exceeded 20%. When existing
child support obligations were subtracted from gross income, the average ratio of award to income
increased to 21% (median 17.9%); more than a third (36%) of sample obligors had award-to-
adjusted-income ratios exceeding 20%.
Under the guidelines, awards should be higher when an obligor has more income and lower
when he has less income, when he has other children that he is supporting, and when he has more
residential time with the child(ren) subject to a support award. All of these legislatively prescribed
variables were, for our sample, highly significant predictors of award value; after stepwise regres-
sion analysis, the father’s income, total parental income, the father’s parenting days, the number of
children to be supported by the order, and the credit the father received for supporting other chil-
dren were all significant at the .001 confidence level. The fact that the mother’s income was proba-
bly imputed and a parental history of mental health problems or drug/alcohol abuse also survived
regression analysis. Together, these variables explained almost two-thirds of the variance in support
awards (see Table 3).118
The relatively robust predictability of support calculation in St. Joseph County suggests, at first
blush, that the Support Guidelines are applied in a fair and consistent manner. But there is reason to
be skeptical that this is in fact the case.
First, recall that the incomes of about half of fathers and mothers appear to be imputed or, in plain
English, invented. When income is imputed to a parent, it is impossible to determine how much cash
the parent actually has coming in or how much he could realistically pay in child support.
Second, the credits both fathers and mothers receive for other support obligations may signifi-
cantly alter award values, and they are quite variable. Consider these examples119: Father A, with
$262 (likely imputed) weekly income and four children by two other mothers, received a $101
credit; Father B, again with $262 (likely imputed) weekly income and five children by one other
mother, received a $0 credit; and Father C, again with $262 listed income and with four children by
three mothers, received a $50 credit. This variation is explicable, in large part, by whether prior sup-
port orders are known to support enforcement officials and, if so, the amount the prior order
Table 3
Predictors of Child Support Obligation Value (Fathers Ordered to Pay Support, N = 656)
Variable Beta (Unstand.) Stand. Error Beta (Stand.) T Signif.
(Constant) −4.170 3.738 −1.116 .265
Father’s gross income ($) .139 .009 .662 14.658 <.001
Parenting time (days) −.209 .020 −.271 −10.323 <.001
Children supported this order (#) 10.329 1.447 .188 7.138 <.001
Father’s child support credit ($) −.126 .023 −.144 −5.471 <.001
Total parental income ($) .024 .006 .173 3.838 <.001
Mother’s income imputed at minimum wage −6.634 2.281 −.075 −2.909 .004
Parental history drugs/alcohol/mental problems −5.724 2.351 −.064 −2.435 .015
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required the father to pay (which will, in turn, reflect the incomes (or imputed incomes) of the
father and other mother on the date the earlier order was entered). Thus, Father A’s $101 credit
reflects the two prior support orders to which he was subject when the sample order was entered;
these orders total $101, the exact value of his credit. Father B received a $0 credit because his five
children were unknown to the IV-D staff. They lived out of state and their mother did not succeed
in obtaining a support order against Father B until four years after entry of the order in our sample
case. Father C received only a $50 credit because that was the value of the support order for two of
his children for whom support orders had been entered; his parental rights had already been termi-
nated to one of his other children, ending his support obligation. We cannot say why the other sup-
port order was ignored because it was missing from the file; possibly that is the reason it did not
produce a credit. The file with the missing support order did contain reams of support-enforcement
data; we can confidently say that the father’s arrearage on this order at the time the 2008 order was
entered was $69,000 and counting. However, one cannot suppose that the arrearage is why the order
did not produce a credit; Father C was also in arrears on the order for which he received a $50
credit. At the time the order in our sample case was entered, he owed $2,995, and his driver’s
license had been suspended. Father A, who received a $101 credit, was also in arrears ($1,734) on
one order to which he was subject at the time the sample order was entered. In the other case (as in
ours), Father A’s support obligation was reduced to zero shortly after entry due to his incarceration;
as a result, arrears did not accumulate. We have described only three of 688 cases, but these three
cases are typical of what we saw throughout the sample. Almost invariably, support credits were
based on the values stated in prior support orders, without regard to payment history.
The high level of award predictability in our sample thus appears to reflect, to a very large
extent, the routinization of support calculation rather than genuinely consistent treatment of like
cases. The awards produced by this methodology thus rest, for what is probably a large portion of
the sample, more on wishful thinking than economic reality: fathers were assumed to have incomes
when they were likely unemployed; they were assumed to pay prior support obligations when it was
clear that they were not doing so. Even the credits fathers obtained for overnight visits may not
reflect reality. A large percentage of unmarried fathers significantly reduce their visitation with prior
children after moving on to new relationships.120 In our sample, the number of overnight visits
awarded to the father was a significant predictor of a later motion to increase the support order,121
suggesting that many sample fathers did not in fact use their visitation time. In sum, consistency in
sample support orders appear to represent the consistently rote application of rules ungrounded in
the real-life circumstances of support obligors and their children.
V. SUPPORT NONPAYMENT AND ENFORCEMENT
Slightly more than half (51.3%) of sample fathers’ support orders were not fully paid. Arrearage
values were enormously varied, ranging from $58 to $60,355. For those cases with an arrearage,
the average value was $6,507, the median $4,365.
The size of the arrearage was significantly and positively related to the value of the original
order, the number of children to which the order applied, and the father’s likely imputed income.
Arrearage value was negatively related to parental reconciliation and a 2010 petition year. None of
these relationships is particularly surprising. Imputed income is less likely to represent ability to
pay than real wages; a higher value award will produce a larger arrearage when unpaid, and a later
decision creates a shorter time over which an arrearage can build.
Petition year is also significant because the lower, $104 imputed-income figure was used only in
2010, and the $104-imputed-income cases were much less likely to produce arrearages than higher-
value (minimum-wage) imputed income cases. For fathers with income imputed at $104, 57% had
no arrearage and 75% had an arrearage of $1,500 or less; the group mean was $1,204, the median
$0. For fathers with income imputed at the minimum wage, only 35% had no arrearage and 46%
had an arrearage of $1,500 or less; the group mean was $3,494, the median $1,895.122
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Surprisingly, however, arrearage value was not significantly correlated with either the percentage
of gross income the obligor was required to pay in support or the percentage adjusted for prior sup-
port obligations.123 It is also notable that neither the father’s income nor his other children (the exis-
tence of other families, number of families, or number of children), although significantly
correlated with the size of his arrearage, survived regression analysis as predictive variables. The
total number of residential moves the father was known to have made did survive regression analy-
sis as a predictive variable, however (see Table 4).124
Regression analysis predicted less than 20% of arrearage-value variance, however.125 Again,
what contributes to the growth of arrears for low-income fathers like those in our sample is largely
unexplained by our data.
We also analyzed the value of arrears for the smaller group of cases in which the arrearage value
was greater than zero. Using regression analysis, these variables explained slightly more than a
quarter of case variance.126 For this group, the proportion of obligor gross income represented by
the support obligation (both adjusted for prior support obligations and unadjusted), the number of
children supported by the order, parental reconciliation, the father’s total known moves, his identifi-
cation as African American, and the petition year were predictive.
VI. SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT
Arrearages were typically followed by support enforcement proceedings. 48.9% of paternal sup-
port obligors in our sample—97% of those with an arrearage—were subject to one or another type
of enforcement action. Enforcement proceedings were, unsurprisingly, strongly related to the size of
a father’s arrearage. Logistic regression analysis eliminated all other variables as predictors but pre-
dicted only a modest amount of case variance.127 Enforcement was far more predictable, of course,
when zero-arrearage cases were included. Logistic regression analysis for this larger group
explained two-thirds to nine-tenths of case variance (see Table 5).128
The most typical type of enforcement action was a contempt proceeding, which threatens the obligor
in arrears with jail if he fails to pay some stated sum. Contempt proceedings were brought in 83% of
enforcement cases.129 Indeed, contempt proceedings were often brought multiple times in a single case.
We found that 25.8% of enforcement cases involved two contempt petitions and 12.7% three or more.
By contrast, other forms of support enforcement—driver’s license suspension, asset attachment,
tax refund interception, and wage garnishment—were relatively rare. These enforcement techniques
were used in only 30.1% of enforcement cases.
The reason for contempt being favored over other enforcement techniques is fairly straightfor-
ward: a very high percentage of the obligors in our sample did not have jobs that produced regular
paychecks which could be garnished, tax refunds that might be intercepted, assets that could be
attached, or passports that might be revoked; approximately half of paternal incomes were invented
through income imputation. It is possible that driver’s license suspension might have been more
Table 4
Dollar Value of Child Support Arrearage (Father Ordered to Pay Support, $0 Arrearage Included,
N = 617)
Variable Beta (Unstand.) Stand. Error Beta (Stand.) T Signif.
(Constant) −1458.768 673.863 −2.165 .031
Father’s total known moves 367.728 55.507 .251 6.625 <.001
Children supported this order 1547.933 308.467 .193 5.018 <.001
2010 petition year −1762.773 474.150 −.138 −3.718 <.001
Final CS order ($) 22.414 5.309 .159 4.222 <.001
Parents reconciled −2475.906 682.576 −.138 −3.627 <.001
Father’s imputed income is minimum wage 1495.229 497.757 .115 3.004 .003
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widely utilized, but in checking conviction data for our sample, we discovered that many obligors
had had drivers’ licenses suspended or revoked for other reasons. Other obligors were in prison
where they could not use a driver’s license, and some obligors undoubtedly had failed to obtain
one. Likely, even license suspension is unavailable as a useful enforcement technique for a fairly
large percentage of obligors.
What is less clear from our data is why local IV-D staff vigorously pursue some obligors with
multiple contempt petitions and largely ignore others. Ability to pay does not seem to be a motivat-
ing factor. For the group of fathers with arrearages (the only candidates for enforcement action),
paternal income was not significantly correlated with the number of enforcement proceedings.130
The size of the arrearage, value of the final order, the father’s having imputed income at the
minimum-wage level, and the father’s total known moves were all positively correlated with the
number of contempt petitions. These variables predicted slightly more than 30% of variance in the
number of contempt proceedings (see Table 6).131
The Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Turner v. Rogers,132 requiring “procedures that ensure a
fundamentally fair determination of the critical incarceration-related question, whether the support-
ing parent is able to comply with the support order,” had no apparent impact on local contempt
practice. The sample included fifty-seven cases with orders entered in 2011 or later with arrearages.
Both the mean and median number of contempt actions per year was slightly higher for this post-
Turner group than for cases with earlier order dates.133 Nor is any difference in practice apparent in
the case files. Indeed, post-Turner as well as pre-Turner, contempt orders were entered on default in
a high percentage of cases, completely precluding any individualized inquiry.
Given the typical lack of other alternatives, it is easy to see why contempt proceedings are
widely used. But our data demonstrate that this tempting remedy is not effective in the vast majority
of cases in which it is used. The maximum collected—in a case with an arrearage totaling
Table 5









(Constant) 896.146 1162.488 .771 .441
% of obligor income paid in support (adjusted prior
orders)
44361.350 6506.652 .594 6.818 <.001
2010 petition year −3345.450 760.082 −.216 −4.401 <.001
% of obligor income paid in support (unadjusted) −27283.823 7247.993 −.327 −3.764 <.001
Children supported this order 1899.315 489.337 .214 3.881 <.001
Parents reconciled −2893.830 1256.123 −.123 −2.304 .022
Father’s total known moves 220.911 83.837 .132 2.635 .009
Father is African American −1592.457 781.733 −.102 −2.037 .043
Table 6
Predictors of Contempt Proceedings Number (Father Pays Support, Arrearage Greater than Zero
Dollars, N = 330)
Variable Beta (Unstand.) Stand. Error Beta (Stand.) T Signif.
(Constant) .693 .141 4.905 <.001
Arrearage value ($) 6.955E-5 .000 .450 8.855 <.001
Final CS Order ($) −.006 .001 −.216 −4.229 <.001
Father’s imputed income is minimum wage .443 .116 .191 3.835 <.001
Father’s total known moves .037 .013 .145 2.901 .004
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$18,878—was $6,500. The median value of support collected after contempt proceedings were
brought was a mere $428.92, and absolutely nothing—$0—was collected in 58.3% of contempt
proceeding cases. Even when fathers did pay, it was simply to avoid or escape jail. Almost invari-
ably, arrears began to grow again as soon as the father was released.
Contempt proceedings might also represent an effort to deter further childbearing by obligors
who cannot or will not meet their current support obligations. But, to the extent that contempt pro-
ceedings were motivated by such a goal, they did not work. Among sample fathers, having children
with other mothers after entry of the support order was significantly and positively correlated both
with the initiation of support enforcement134 and the number of contempt proceedings135 brought.
We do not mean to suggest, of course, that contempt proceedings caused further child bearing. But
neither did they deter it.
VII. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF OUR FINDINGS
We can unequivocally say that St. Joseph County’s child support system is broken. In our sam-
ple, fathers were rarely awarded more than token visitation and virtually never awarded joint legal
custody, despite the well-established benefits of contact with both parents. Income was routinely
imputed to parents at a minimum-wage level without any effort to assess actual earning capacity or
to assist the obligor in building work qualifications and obtaining employment. Fathers’ existing
support obligations were credited at face value, perversely incentivizing nonpayment. Enforcement
proceedings were initiated without any assessment of either the reason an arrearage has accrued or
obligor capacity to make current and make-up payments. Contempt proceedings were routinely uti-
lized for enforcement despite their lack of efficacy, high cost, and potential for causing obligors to
go underground and discontinue or limit contact with their children. In sum, child support practice
in St. Joseph County promotes limited contact between children and their absent fathers, nonpay-
ment of prior support obligations, and the accrual of arrears that can never be paid. A lot of tax-
payer money is spent in pursuit of these irrational goals.
We are not, of course, the first to criticize routinized overuse of income imputation and contempt
proceedings. It is these very practices that the new federal regulations, just now effective, were
designed to curb. Our study unequivocally supports the need for these new rules and their emphasis
on individualized assessment of both income and capacity to pay when arrearages develop. It also
supports the current policy shift away from costly, ineffectual contempt proceedings and toward
job-skills and employment training. Such programs should, in our view, be mandatory for all obli-
gors who are incarcerated or in residential treatment programs and highly incentivized for high-risk,
unemployed obligors living in the community. Designing programs that work will not be easy or
cheap, of course. But an investment in training makes much more sense than an investment in inef-
fective threats of jail. In our view, savings from reduced reliance on contempt proceedings should
be quantified and dedicated to the development of best practices skills training and employment
programs.
Our data also support additional changes in support practice. In this brief article, we can only
outline further directions for reform. But, just as our data demonstrate the need for the reforms cur-
rently in progress, we believe that they also demonstrate the inadequacy of these reforms.
First, our data demonstrate the need to extend individualized assessment to support crediting. It
is perverse to equally credit payment obligations when a father pays everything and when he pays
nothing. This sort of routinization unfairly penalizes fathers who do pay. It also incentivizes the
accumulation of new support obligations.
Second, our data demonstrate that changes in parenting-time allocation and custody assignment
are necessary adjuncts to shifts in support rules. As we noted above, researchers have found again
and again that the payment of both formal and informal support is significantly correlated with par-
enting time. Parents are more likely to support children with whom they have lived for substantial
periods and those whom they see frequently after separation136; fathers’ contact with children is
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also associated with less hardship in the child’s household.137 While it is unclear whether visitation
promotes support payment or whether other factors promote both outcomes, it is clear that, unless
contact exposes the child to high levels of parental conflict, children who spend meaningful
amounts of time with both parents tend to do better than children who do not.138
Researchers have found that income is significantly correlated with shared parenting and visita-
tion time, both when parents divorce and when they separate; higher income is associated with
more shared parenting.139 Our findings are consistent with this earlier research. But there is no evi-
dence that children of low-income parents benefit less from visitation than do children of high-
income parents.
Given the various advantages to children associated with meaningful father contact, we believe
that IV-D agencies must develop policies that ensure children enjoy significant amounts of time
with nonresidential fathers except in cases where such visitation would be harmful.140 There is sim-
ply no excuse for the fact that two thirds of sample fathers were awarded literally no overnight visits
with their children. Nor is there any possible excuse for the lack of shared physical and legal cus-
tody orders in our sample.141 In contrast to some states, the courts that hear paternity and related
child support matters in Indiana are not precluded from addressing custody and visitation.142 To the
contrary, visitation time is included on the child support worksheet that the local IV-D agency uti-
lizes. Moreover, although intimate-partner violence is a common cause of relationship dissolution
in low-income, nonmarital families like those that we studied,143 prior orders of protection were not
significantly correlated with the number of visitation days awarded to fathers in our sample.144 This
good reason for restricting visitation cannot explain the low level of visitation awarded fathers and
the lack of joint custody orders.
Guidelines, like those already in effect in Indiana,145 which specify that unmarried fathers have
the same visitation rights as married fathers, are clearly inadequate to promote the routine award of
meaningful visitation time. More robust legislation is needed. Legislative action should be pre-
ceded, however, by more research on the sources of current visitation awards and on the effects of
different statutory regimes.146 While the significant associations between visitation time and the
father’s failure to appear at the hearing and lack of a lawyer both suggest that court practice plays
an important role in producing the outcomes we have documented, other factors may well be at
work, too. For example, fathers in our sample had a high level of residential instability; a significant
number may not have housing adequate for overnight visits. Visitation schedules could be altered to
take daytime visitation into account. Some states already follow this approach,147 which might serve
the valuable purpose of facilitating maternal employment as well as paternal visitation. New legisla-
tion is necessary, but it should be guided by research into the needs of families like those in our
sample and the causes of visitation awards like those that predominated in our sample.
Finally, our data demonstrate the difficulties in moving beyond routine income imputation in a
way that meets the competing goals of fairness and payment incentivization. Certainly, pass-through
laws that incentivize payment by low-income obligors should be universal. In our view, obligors
should also receive credit for in-kind support, assuming that the custodial parent is content with this
form of contribution. Child support worksheets could easily be reformulated to take such contribu-
tions into account, and both parents could easily be involved in a discussion of how much support
should be paid in-kind and in cash. In appropriate cases, fathers could also be given credit for child-
care that facilitates maternal employment.
A self-support reserve for low-income obligors would also be valuable. Such a reserve would
recognize the obligor’s legitimate subsistence needs, reduce the likelihood of impossible-to-pay
awards, and potentially create incentives for legal, higher-wage employment.
However, formulating rules that appropriately impute income to unemployed fathers—rules that
are easy to use, consistently produce support obligations that can be met, and promote parent–child
contact, parental harmony, and employment—will not be easy. Further, while the new regulations
demanding individualized assessment are needed and overdue, an individualized-assessment man-
date will not, by itself, produce altered results any more than did the Indiana statute, specifying that
nonmarital parents have the same visitation rights as marital parents or the Supreme Court’s
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decision in Turner v. Rogers. Neither the statute nor Turner had any apparent effect on case proces-
sing in our sample, and there is no reason to expect that the new federal mandate will achieve more.
The law on the books is simply not the same as the law in action.
It is also far from clear how the harried IV-D attorney, burdened with a caseload numbering in
the hundreds, typically confronted with obligors who have minimal work experience, poor job qual-
ifications, and a range of problems—prior incarceration, a history of drug abuse or alcoholism, lack
of a car, and mental and/or physical impairments—is supposed to translate the individualized-
inquiry mandate into an individualized dollars-and-cents number. The problems are legion. In some
cases, the obligor will not even be present; 9.5% of fathers in our sample defaulted. Very few will
have legal representation. Only 15.4% of sample fathers and 12.1% of sample mothers were repre-
sented by counsel; in only 6.5% of cases were both parties represented. Moreover, of course, lawyer
representation is most rare in cases of imputed income; parent with imputed income typically lack
money to pay a lawyer. 20.2% of fathers without imputed income were represented by counsel as
compared to 8.8% of fathers with imputed income.
Checklists and similar decision-making tools are unlikely to be adequate. Assume the typical
candidate for imputed income, an unemployed obligor with no special skills, a high school educa-
tion, who has not worked in the past year, and has no work experience beyond minimum-wage
employment; the obligor is not clearly disabled. Then consider one such decision-making tool,
which requires the imputation decision maker to take into account:
a. The parent’s prior employment experience;
b. The parent’s education;
c. The parent’s physical and mental disabilities, if any;
d. The availability of employment in the geographic area in which the parent resides;
e. The prevailing wage and salary levels in the geographic area in which the parent resides;
f. The parent’s special skills and training;
g. Whether there is evidence that the parent has the ability to earn the imputed income;
h. The age and special needs of the child subject to the child support order…;
i. The parent’s increased earning capacity because of experience;
j. The parent’s decreased earning capacity because of a felony conviction; or
k. Any other relevant factor.148
Using these factors, how much income should be imputed to the obligor? The answer is almost
certainly a minimum-wage income, the very same value that decision makers now turn to. There is
no basis for assuming more income and, given the obligor’s lack of a disability, no particular basis
for assuming less. There is, of course, the fact that the obligor is not working and has not been
working. But unless the local unemployment rate is particularly high, why shouldn’t the decision
maker assume that reasonable effort would turn up a minimum-wage job?
Should we do away with income imputation for cases like this one? The advantage of a no-
imputation strategy is that the obligor will not accumulate arrears. He may also be more motivated to
spend time with his child if he does not feel hounded by the support enforcement agency. However,
the large disadvantage of assuming that all unskilled, unemployed obligors have no earning capacity
is that their incentives to obtain employment and better job skills are markedly reduced. Moreover,
the research evidence demonstrates that most low-income fathers do have some income. Here, fathers
with imputed income often developed arrearages, but most also made some payments. Moreover,
researchers have found that about half of fathers make in-kind contributions and informal payments
to mothers.149 In one study, support paid informally to mothers averaged $175 per month.150 Where
does the money come from? Researchers who have reported on in-kind contributions do not detail
the sources of paternal income and our study, too, offers no data on this important question. At this
point, it is fair to say that we simply don’t know how much the typical “unemployed” obligor brings
in, let alone what he could realistically earn in the legal, wage economy.
Our research data do demonstrate that low-value imputed income is far less likely to produce
arrearages than minimum-wage-level imputed income. For fathers with income imputed at $104,
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57% had no arrearage and 75% had an arrearage of $1500 or less; for fathers with income imputed
at the minimum wage, only 35% had no arrearage and only 46% had an arrearage of $1500 or less.
The average arrearage value of the minimum-wage group was also close to triple that of the $104
group.151 This difference strongly supports an approach, for disadvantaged fathers like those in our
sample, that minimizes the level at which income is imputed. Support enforcement proceedings are
costly and largely ineffectual for this group. There is no obvious value in using an unrealistic, fic-
tional income value to produce an award that will not be paid and will cost the state money for
futile collection efforts.
Beyond these basics, we think more research is needed. Likely, the best approach would test
multiple income-imputation models over time to come up with the most workable approach.
As the states turn their attention to meeting the requirements of the new federal regulations, they
will be tempted to rely on factor lists, like the one we quoted, and whitewash the difficulty of apply-
ing it. We hope that, instead, they honestly confront the difficulties of compliance and avoid this
road to failure.
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or imputed) of each parent minus the value of each parent’s credit for supporting children not covered by the current order.
106. This value reflects both credits for prior support orders and the father’s share of total parental income.
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107. In a study of 2008 Indiana divorces, failure to appear was also a significant predictor of visitation time. See Brinig,
supra note 102, at 503.
108. The final order, which represents what the obligor parent must pay in child support, is based on the basic award.
Each parent’s work-related child-care costs and health insurance premiums paid on behalf of the covered children are added
to the basic award. The presumptive child ssupport order is calculated by multiplying this sum by the obligor parent’s per-
centage of total income adjusted for prior child support obligations. The presumptive award becomes the final award unless
the parents deviate from the presumptive award by agreement.
109. Adjusted R2 = .300.
110. Pearson’s r = .020, p = .614.
111. The Indiana guidelines take account of visitation with a numerical formula based on the number of nights, which
the child spends in the noncustodial parent’s household. See IND. CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES, supra note 81, at § G. The current
guidelines are available at http://www.in.gov/judiciary/rules/child_support/ (last visited August 22, 2018).
112. The support values contained in the Indiana guidelines are revised every four years, most recently in 2015. All initial
support awards for families in our sample were based on guideline values effective during 2007–2011.
113. IND. CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES, supra note 81, at § 2.
114. N = 655.
115. Pearson’s r = .728, p < .001.
116. Pearson’s r = .267, p < .001.
117. N = 595.
118. Adjusted R2 = .650.
119. The examples derive from random selection of an income-imputation group (i.e., $262 per week). We then selected
the first three listed cases in which the father had more than three children with other mothers.
120. See Wendy Manning & Pamela Smock, “Swapping” Families?: Serial Parenting and Economic Support for Chil-
dren, 62 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 111 (2000).
121. For cases in which the father was required to pay support, Pearson’s r = .095, p = .016.
122. N = 49, $104 group; N = 88, minimum-income group.
123. Percentage of gross income, Pearson’s r = .008, p = .845; percentage of adjusted income, Pearson’s
r = .035, p = .391.
124. Residential instability might result from the attempt to evade contempt proceedings. Or, conversely, residential insta-
bility might contribute to the accrual of a large arrearage.
125. Adjusted R2 = .168.
126. Adjusted R2 = .276.
127. Cox & Snell R2 = .026; Nagelkerke R2 = .226.
128. Cox & Snell R2 = .660; Nagelkerke R2 = .880.
Variable Beta Stand. Error Signif. Odds Ratio
Biggest arrearage .005 .001 <.001 1.005
Postorder petition more parenting time 1.154 .482 .017 3.171
Constant −2.942 .261 <.001 .053
129. N = 322.
130. Pearson’s r = .060, p = .281 (N = 324).
131. Adjusted R2 = .327.
132. Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 435 (2011).
133. For arrearage cases with orders entered after 2010 (n = 57), mean contempts per year = .1653; median = .1483. For
cases with orders entered in 2010 or earlier (n = 282), mean contempts per year = .1510; median = .1121.
134. Pearson’s r = .268, p < .001.
135. Pearson’s r = .283, p < .001.
136. See sources cited in note 55, supra.
137. See Nepomnyaschy & Garfinkel, supra note 46.
138. See PAUL R. AMATO & ALAN BOOTH, A GENERATION AT RISK: GROWING UP IN AN ERA OF FAMILY UPHEAVAL 220 (1997);
Robert Bauserman, Child Adjustment in Joint-Custody Versus Sole-Custody Arrangements: A Meta-Analytic Review, 16 J.
FAM. PSYCHOL. 91, 97–98 (2002); Willliam V. Fabricius & Linda J. Luecken, Post-Divorce Living Arrangements, Parent Con-
flict, and Long-Term Physical Health Correlates of Children of Divorce, 21 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 195 (2007); Valerie King & J?
M. Sobolewski, Nonresident Fathers’ Contributions to Adolescent Well-Being, 68 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 537 (2006); M?
F. Whiteside & B? J. Becker, Parental Factors and the Young Child’s Postdivorce Adjustment: A Meta-Analysis with Implica-
tions for Parenting Arrangements, 14 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 5 (2000).
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139. See Judi Bartfeld, Shared Placement: An Overview of Prevalence, Trends, Economic Implications, and Impacts on
Child Well-Being (2011), https://www.irp.wisc.edu/research/childsup/cspolicy/pdfs/2011-12/Task13-CS2011-12-Report.pdf;
Brinig, supra note 102, at 491–94, figs. 3–4; Marygold S. Melli & Patricia R. Brown, Exploring A New Family Form—The
Shared Time Family, 22 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 231 (2008); Suzanne Reynolds et al., Back to the Future: An Empirical Study
of Child Custody Outcomes, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1629 (2007).
140. Again, we are not the first to make such criticisms. See, e.g., CLAIRE HUNTINGTON, FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW
UNDERMINES FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS 190–92 (2014); Maldonado, supra note 54; Laura Tach et al., The Family-Go-Round: Fam-
ily Complexity and Father Involvement from a Father’s Perspective, 654 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. SCI. 169 (2014).
141. Joint legal custody is associated with more visitation, although not with higher levels of child support after preexist-
ing parental attributes are taken into account. See Marjorie L. Gunnoe & Sanford L. Braver, The Effects of Joint Legal Cus-
tody on Mothers, Fathers, and Children Controlling for Factors that Predispose a Sole Maternal Versus Joint Legal Award,
25 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 25 (2001); Judith A. Seltzer, Father by Law: Effects of Joint Legal Custody on Nonresident Fathers’
Involvement with Children, 35 DEMOGRAPHY 135 (1998).
142. See Stacy L. Brustin & Lisa V. Martin, Paved with Good Intentions: Unintended Consequences of Federal Proposal
to Integrate Child Support and Parenting Time, 48 IND. L. REV. 803, 815 (2015).
143. See, e.g., KATHRYN EDIN & MARIA KEFALAS, PROMISES I CAN KEEP: WHY POOR WOMEN PUT MOTHERHOOD BEFORE MARRIAGE
(2005); Anna Aizer, Poverty, Violence and Health: The Impact of Domestic Violence During Pregnancy on Newborn Health,
46 J. HUM. RESOURCES 518 (2011) (reviewing evidence and reporting that women with income below $10,000 report rates of
domestic violence five times greater than those with annual income greater than $30,000). See also Deborah M. Capaldi
et al., A Systematic Review of Risk Factors for Intimate Partner Violence, 3 PARTNER ABUSE 231 (2012).
144. Pearson’s r = −.020, p = .614. Postoorder protective orders were significantly and positively correlated with father’s
visitation time, however (Pearson’s r = .137, p < .001); when fathers had more visitation time, it was more likely that a pro-
tection order against one or the other parent would be entered. Postorder protective orders were also significantly and posi-
tively correlated with postorder motions for a custody shift or an alteration (positive or negative) in visiting time (p < .001).
Greater amounts of visitation time may signify a higher level of father involvement that sometimes creates conflict or it may
simply offer more opportunity for the continuation of prior parental conflict. Certainly, when intimate-partner violence
occurs, courts should make sure that children are not exposed to it, limiting parental visitation as is needed to achieve
that goal.
145. See Indiana Rules of Court, Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines § C.1, https://www.in.gov/judiciary/rules/parenting/
parenting.pdf.
146. Some states have statutes which specify that both parents have equal guardianship or custody rights regardless of
marital status, for example. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-606 (West 2015) (“The father and mother of every minor
child are joint guardians of the person of the minor, and the powers, rights and duties of the father and the mother in regard
to the minor shall be equal”); ME. REV. STAT. TIT. 19-A § 1651 (2015) (“The father and mother are the joint natural guardians
of their minor children and are jointly entitled to the care, custody, control, services and earnings of their children. Neither
parent has any rights paramount to the rights of the other with reference to any matter affecting their children”). But we lack
evidence that these statutes are associated with results different from those we found in Indiana.
147. See Arizona Supreme Court, Arizona Child Support Guidelines (July, 2015), https://des.az.gov/sites/default/files/
2015CSGuidelinesRED.pd (describing methodology for counting partial days of visitation).
148. OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 5101:12–45-10 (2017).
149. See supra note 45.
150. See Kane et al., supra note 44 (total includes in-kind and cash support).
151. The minimum-wage group mean was $3494, the median $1895. The $104 group mean was $1204, the median $0.
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